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Malta, Slovenia, Slovakia and Estonia also adopted Euro. The paper analyses the way these states 
accomplished the convergence criteria in order to emphasize the difficulties they encountered and how 
they solved all these problems, lessons to learn for Romania in the EMU integration process.    
 
Keywords: EMU, accession, convergence criteria, inflation, budget deficit, long-term interest rates,  
gross public debt  
 
INTRODUCTION    
 
After their accession to the EU in 2004, the new ten member states intensified their 
efforts to enter the Exchange Rate Mechanism II – regarded as a “waiting room” of the euro 
area that offers at best little value-added and may even entail certain risks (Backé, P. et all., 
2004). During this time, the economic, financial and institutional differences between those 
countries and those belonging to the euro area were significant, and consequently, the efforts 
to achieve the convergence increased, but many times, implying high costs.  The fundamental 
characteristic of the ten countries that joined the EU in 2004, compared to the twelve states, 
already part of the Economic and Monetary Union, was the high difference between the levels 
of development measured through the GDP/capita. In addition to the fact that certain sectors 
of the economy of these countries had not gotten completely past the transition process to the 
market economy, there was the danger that once the convergence process had accelerated, the 
level of volatility of the economic growth would increase.  In this case, the business cycles of 
the countries at stake would have been out of sync with those of the economies of the euro 
area (European Comission, 2008). This situation would have reduced the efficiency of a 
unique, superstate monetary policy that, at some point, would have become no longer 
desirable for the new states.  
We have to take into account that the analysis of the level of fulfillment of the 
convergence criteria must be carried out in the context of their sustainability (Sławomir I. 
Bukowski, 2005). The adoption of the euro is an irrevocable process, and that is why, the 
convergence process must be conducted with long-term effects. In order to attain a sustainable 
convergence process, countries are to make efforts, which aim mainly at the necessity to 
accomplish and maintain both the stability of prices and an optimum level of the public 
finances. 
The goal of the research was to evaluate the process of adopting the single currency 
by the new member states, both through the analysis of the level of fulfillment of the 
convergence criteria and the measures taken in this respect by the 5 states that entered the EU 
in 2004 and adopted the euro currency, lessons to learn for Romania in the EMU integration 
process. 
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MATERIALS AND METHODS    
 
In order to achieve the goal of the paper, was used methodological instruments, such 
as the descriptive research, the critical comparative analysis, deduction and forecasting.  
The descriptive research was used to point out the convergence criteria that the 
member states are to achieve if they want to be part of the euro area. Was analyzed five case 
studies to detail the ways in which the five states went through the convergence process and 
the euro adoption process and to present their economic experience. The quantitative and 
qualitative analysis was used to collect and interpret the macroeconomic statistical data of the 
countries that entered the euro area. The comparative analysis was used mainly to find 
parallelism between the dynamic evolutions registered in the different analyzed countries. The 
deduction and forecasting were used so that Romania could learn the negatives and positives 
in the process of adhering to the euro area. 
 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS   
 
In general, economists agree that entering the euro area brings a series of advantages, 
such as the elimination of the currency risk and the protection against the speculative attacks 
on the exchange rate. Nevertheless, the crisis that erupted has brought to light a series of 
inconveniences, which have determined the countries outside the monetary union to adopt a 
more reserved attitude towards the euro.  
It seems that smaller EU member states succeed in adhering to the euro area faster 
than larger states. Indeed, from 1999 and the second phase of the ERM, Estonia, Lithuania 
and Slovenia adhered to the ERM II in June 2004 (less than two months after having entered 
the EU) and in May 2005, Cyprus, Latvia and Malta entered the ERM II too.  
After the fall of communism and the transition to the market economy, the Central 
and Eastern European countries registered a drop in the total GDP, a situation that was caused 
by the old production technologies and by the opening of markets, which allowed the western 
competitive products to be marketed.  
Nevertheless, from 2000 the majority of countries have registered accelerated 
increases in the GDP. This tendency has been caused by the inflow of foreign direct 
investments and by the global drop in the interest rates generated by the rapid development of 
the financial sectors that have finally led to the increase in the domestic consumption.  
Because of the data regarding the GDP between 2006 and 2011, one can notice the 
contraction from 2009, but all five countries reported increases in the GDP in 2010, while in 
2011 they even managed to surpass the level reached in 2008, with the exception of Slovenia 
(Tab. 1).  
 
Tab. 1 
GDP evolution (at market prices)  
 
 
Tara 
 
2006 
 
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Cyprus 14,671 15,902 17,157 16,854 17,334 17,929 
Malta 5,058 5,434 5,815 5,813 6,154 6,440 
Slovenia 31,051 34,562 37,280 35,311 35,416 35,811 
Slovakia 44,502 54,811 64,500 62,896 65,887 69,945 
Estonia 13,391 16,069 16,304 13,840 14,305 16,012 
Source: Eurostat, 2012  
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The increase in the trade between the European states, as well as the depth of the 
financial integration were accomplished also by the implementation of both the institutional 
reforms and legal regulations necessary for the successful adherence to the EU. 
The convergence monetary criteria refer to the inflation rate, the long-term interest 
rate and the exchange rate. The three criteria of monetary convergence are based mainly on 
inflation, thus implying the main objective of the harmonization of monetary policies, that is, 
to maintain the stability of prices. The budgetary criteria of convergence refer to deficits and 
public debt, but also to the seigniorial right. The main objectives aimed at through the 
convergence criteria are the fact that each country is responsible fiscally and that the 
participating countries are sufficiently alike to guarantee a single monetary policy.   
Slovenia was the first country from the group of the ten new member states, which 
succeeded in fulfilling all criteria for the adoption of the single currency, with respect to the 
public debt, budgetary deficit and interest rates.  
 
Tab.2 
Level of fulfillment of the convergence criteria by Slovenia 
 
 Inflation Long-term interest 
rate 
Budgetary surplus 
or deficit 
Gross public debt 
2003 5.7 6.4 -2.8 29.1 
2004 3.7 5.2 -2.3 29.5 
2005 2.5 3.8 -1.8 29.1 
Reference value 2.4 6.4 -3.0 60.0 
Source: BCE, Convergence reports, 2004, May 2006 
 
With respect to inflation, Slovenia registered a low inflation rate only for a short 
period of time. The inflation dropped progressively until 1999, reaching 6.1%, when the 
downward trend was interrupted, and once again after 2000, down from 8.9%. This increase 
was caused by a series of factors, the most important ones being the introduction of the VAT, 
the increase in both the salaries and import prices. The disinflation process turned out to be a 
success after 2000 when inflation dropped gradually, reaching 2.5% in 2005.  This was 
possible following some decisions of economic policy. An important moment took place in 
2001 when the Bank of Slovenia set its monetary policy objective, that is, the stability of 
prices.  
Starting with June 28 2004, the Slovenian tolar entered the ERM II mechanism at the 
central parity of 239.64 tolar/ euro, which was very close to the existing market rate at that 
moment. Because of the participation to the ERM II, the tolar remained very close to its 
central parity.(Banka Slovenije, 2006) 
 The Council did not hand down a decision to Slovenia with respect to an excessive 
deficit. In 2003, the country reported a 2.8% budget deficit of GDP, while in 2005 the budget 
deficit was way under the reference value, that is, 1.8% of GDP.   
The level of the long-term interest rates in Slovenia dropped from 6.4% in 2003 to 
3.8% in 2005, under the reference value for the criterion concerning the interest rates. The 
long-term interest rates in Slovenia had the same evolution as the interest rates of bonds in the 
euro area. This reflects the trust in both the monetary policy and the exchange rate policy of 
the Bank of Slovenia and in the economic and fiscal development of this state.  
The gross public debt dropped to 29.1% in 2005, way under the 60% reference level 
of GDP. 
Following the adoption of the euro, there was a noticeable increase of 8.8% in the 
GDP, as a result of the liberalization of trade with the EU, determined by: 
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- the reduction of the firms’ production costs by 5 to 8%, because of the elimination 
of customs, the liberalization of public acquisitions, financial services and scale economies. 
- positive effects of economic growth, implying 2.4-2.7% of GDP. The identified 
effects are relevant not only to Slovenia, but also to the other countries in Central and Eastern 
Europe, which have already adopted the euro or are during the adoption process.  
- the diminution and even the complete elimination of customs in the trade with the 
EU has negative effects on the domestic producers. The most affected exporter-producers 
were those operating in the field of agriculture, in terms of raw materials and manufactured 
products.      
- the classic protection instruments through price (tariff and non-tariff instruments) 
diminished their role a great deal.  In their place, there are used active measures for the 
promotion of exports and selective measures for the protection of certain products/branches, 
seeing the limits imposed by the EU’s competition policy. 
 - the state budget reduced, following the drop in the customs revenues and the 
increase in the costs with the active measures for the support of production, which also 
imposed the necessity of a reform in the fiscal system. Slovenia’s GDP dropped by 7.4% in 
2009, but this drop compensated for an increase of 1.3% in 2010 and a growth prevision for 
2011 of 2%. In 2009 Slovenia’s public debt was 6.3% of GDP, in 2010 the public debt went 
up to 7%, while in 2011 it registered a slight drop, coming down to 6.9% of GDP. The 
forecasts for Slovenia’s economic growth for 2011 and 2012 are rather above the average of 
the euro area, as for 2011 there was a growth of 1.6%, while for 2012 the growth reached 
1.8%. Moreover, the forecast for 2016 shows a similar image, with a foreseen growth of 
1.9%, above the 1.7% average of the euro area.  
Cyprus is the third island by size in the Mediterranean Sea, after Sicily and Sardinia, 
with a population of approximately 767.000 people. Cyprus gained its independence in 1960 
and adhered to the EU in 2004. Cyprus’ national currency was the Cypriot pound, but on 
December 21, the Central Bank of Cyprus lowered its main rate of refinancing by 0.5% to the 
level of 4% of the key interest rate of the European Central Bank (ECB), before adhering to 
the euro area on January 1st 2008. 
 
Tab.3 
Level of fulfillment of the convergence criteria by Cyprus 
 
 Inflation Long-term interest 
rate 
Budgetary surplus 
or deficit 
Gross public debt 
2005 2.0 5.2 -2.3 69.2 
2006 2.0 4.1 -1.5 65.3 
2007 2.0 4.2 -1.4 61.5 
Reference value 3.0 6.4 -3.0 60.0 
Source: BCE, Convergence report, 2007 
 
The inflation in Cyprus has been over the years at a low level, with the exception of 
certain periods when it registered a relatively high level. Between 1997 and 2006, the rate of 
inflation oscillated between 2% and 3%. On the other hand, between 2000 and 2003, it 
increased up to 4.9% and 4.0% respectively, because of the high increases in the prices of 
energy and food, as well as because of the gradual increases in energy taxes and the VAT 
quota, which between 2002 and 2003 rose from 10% to 15%, due to the harmonization 
process according to the EU legislation.  This evolution of inflation in the long run illustrates 
a series of important decisions with respect to the economic policy, the most significant one 
being related to the long tradition of fixed exchange rates regimes, dating from 1960.  
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After having adhered to the EU, the inflation in Cyprus was around 2%, under the 
reference value of 3%. 
The Council did not hand down a decision to Cyprus with respect to an excessive 
deficit. In 2006, Cyprus reported a fiscal deficit of 1.5%, way under the reference value, while 
in 2007 the deficit represented 1.4% of GDP.   
In 2006, the share of the public debt in the GDP reduced significantly up to 65.3%, 
while in 2007 the reduction continued to 61.5%, but remaining above the reference value of   
60%. 
The Cypriot pound entered the ERM II on May 2nd 2005 for a reference period of to 
years (May 2005 – April 2007). The central parity was set at 0.585274 pounds/euro – the 
same parity at which the pound was unilaterally anchored to the euro at the beginning of 1999 
– with a standard fluctuation bandwidth of ± 15%. Since entering the ERM II, Cyprus 
continued to promote a policy for a stable exchange rate against the euro (Central Bank of 
Cyprus, 2007). The pound remained close to its central parity, indicating as well a very low 
volatility of the exchange rate against the euro. At the same time, the short-term interest rates 
differentials reduced gradually in comparison with the Euribor three-month interest rate, 
becoming null towards the end of the analyzed period. The long-term interest rates from 
Cyprus have been around 4.2%, way under the 6.4% reference value of the criterion 
concerning the interest rates.  
Malta, with the capital at Valetta, has a population of approximately 402.000 people, 
which gained its independence in 1964. Malta’s national currency is the Maltese pound.   
Malta entered the ERM II on May 4th 2005. On December 28th the central bank of Malta 
reduced its interest rate by 0.25%, down to 4%, in order to close the convergence process 
within the context of the adherence to the euro area.  
The inflation in Malta has been relatively stable, oscillating especially between 2% 
and 3% during 1999-2006. Maintaining a relatively stable inflation over a long period reflects 
a series of important decisions with respect to the promoted economic policy, the most 
significant one being the decision taken when Malta became independent in 1964, that is, to 
keep a fixed exchange rate regime, anchored for most of the time to a currency basket.  
The recent evolutions indicate that in 2005, a gradual economic recovery began, one 
that continued also in 2006, but the pressures exerted by demand on prices remained at a low 
level. The annual rate of the HIPC inflation registered a significant drop towards the end of 
2006 and remained at a low level at the beginning of the year. 
 After having reached a maximum level of almost 3.5% in the middle of 2006, the 
annual rate of inflation dropped below 1% in the last two months of 2006, being around 0.5% 
in the month of March 2007. The reduction of inflation at the end of 2006 was due greatly to 
the fundamental effect determined by the previous increases in energy prices, which 
influenced quite significantly the inflation registered by Malta.   
On May 2nd 2005, the Maltese pound entered the ERM II, being anchored to the euro 
area. After a vigorous period of economic growth in the 90’s, the increase in the GDP was on 
average very low after 2001, when for two consecutive years the production dropped. This 
economic stagnation was a consequence of both the difficult external situation, partially 
associated with a stiff competition on Malta’s main export markets, and of the domestic 
factors, such as the temporary effects of the restructuring process in the manufacturing 
industry.  
The Council handed down a decision to Malta with respect to the existence of an 
excessive deficit. Nevertheless, in 2006 this country registered a fiscal deficit of 2.6% in the 
GDP, a level under the reference value. This reduction was possible through temporary 
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measures of fiscal policy, without which, according to calculations, the deficit would have 
been somewhere around the value of 3.3% in the GDP.  
 
Tab.4 
Level of fulfillment of the convergence criteria by Malta 
 
 Inflation Long-term 
interest rate 
Budgetary surplus 
or deficit 
Gross public debt 
2005 2.5 4.6 -3.1 72.4 
2006 2.6 4.3 -2.6 66.5 
2007 2.0 4.3 -2.1 65.9 
Reference value 3.0 6.4 -3.0 60.0 
Source: BCE, Convergence report, 2007 
 
The share of the public debt in the GDP dropped to 66.5% in 2006 and 65.9% in 
2007. Despite all these efforts, the share of the public debt remained above the reference value 
of 60%.  
The Maltese pound entered the ERM II on May 2nd 2005 for a reference period of to 
years (May 2005 – April 2007). The central parity for the Maltese pound was set at 0.429300 
pounds/euro – the market quotation when it entered this mechanism – with a standard 
fluctuation bandwidth of ± 15%. When it entered the mechanism, the Maltese pound was 
reanchored to the euro, dropping the currency basket, which consisted of the euro, the British 
pound and the US dollar (Central Bank of Malta., 2007).   
The long-term interest rates in Malta were at 4.3%, way under the 6.4% reference 
value for the criterion concerning the interest rates. Over the last years, the long-term interest 
rates in Malta and the differential between these interest rates and the government bonds 
yields in the euro area have registered generally a drop. 
In 2009, when Slovakia joined the euro area, the single currency was seen as both a 
guarantee of the financial stability and an insurance against some strong fluctuations of the 
local currencies. Slovakia adhered to the euro area hoping to benefit from protection during 
the crisis.  
 
Tab.5 
Level of fulfillment of the convergence criteria by Slovakia 
 
 Inflation Long-term interest 
rate 
Budgetary surplus 
or deficit 
Gross public debt 
2006 4.3 4.4 -3.6 30.4 
2007 1.9 4.5 -2.2 29.4 
2008 2.2 4.5 -2.0 29.2 
Reference value 3.2 6.5 -3.0 60.0 
Source: BCE, Convergence report, 2008 
 
In Slovakia, inflation measured through consumer prices has been volatile over the 
years and sometimes situated at a high level, that is, on average, starting with 1998, the level 
of inflation was 6.5%. The evolution of inflation must be analyzed within the context of a 
solid and rapid growth in terms of real GDP over the last years. After 2006, the appreciation 
trend of the Slovak crown exchange rate was the factor that exerted an inhibitive impact on 
inflation. In 2007, the HIPC inflation reduced at first, thanks to the moderate evolution of 
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domestic prices for energy. Subsequently, the annual rate of the HIPC inflation started to 
increase once again, mainly due to the increase in prices for food, energy and services within 
the context of some inflationary pressures both internationally and nationally.  
The Council handed down a decision to Slovakia with respect to the existence of an 
excessive deficit. The deadline for the correction of the deficit was 2007 when Slovakia 
registered a fiscal deficit of 2.2% in the GDP, under the 3% reference value.  
The share of the public debt dropped to 29.4% in the GDP in 2007 and 29.2% in 
2008, under the 60% reference value.  
The Slovak crown entered the ERM II for a period longer than two years, before the 
evaluation made by the ECB with respect to the convergence. The ERM II central parity for 
the Slovak currency was initially set at 38.4550 crowns/1 euro, with a standard fluctuation 
bandwidth of ± 15%. The Slovak crown was relatively volatile against the euro during the 
reference period. During the period April – July 2006, there was a temporary pressure on the 
Slovak currency, in terms of depreciation and so, for some time it was transacted slightly 
under its ERM II central parity (National Bank of Slovakia., 2007).  
Starting from the middle of 2006, the Slovak crown appreciated significantly, as a 
result of some solid economic fundamentals, while its central parity was reevaluated by 8.5%, 
up to a level of 35.4424 coroane/1 euro, applicable from March 19th 2007. Subsequently, the 
crown fluctuated systematically, exceeding significantly the level of the new central parity, 
which caused the maximal ascendant deviation to reach 8.9%. Broadly speaking, the 
participation period to the ERM II was characterized by a gradual appreciation of the Slovak 
crown against the euro. This participation made things more difficult for the analysis of the 
Slovak economy in the context of irrevocably fixed exchange rates.  
The long-term interest rates registered on average 4.5%, a level inferior to the 
reference value of 6.5% for the criterion regarding the interest rate. The long-term interest 
rates registered relatively the same dynamic as the long-term interest rates in the euro area. 
Judging by Slovakia and Slovenia’s experiences, in the short term, the adoption of 
the euro brought a tendency for an upward adjustment of the prices, an increased inflationary 
pressure and the reduction of the exports’ competitiveness. On the other hand, the states using 
their national currencies have the capacity to increase their competitiveness through the 
depreciation of the exchange rate. 
For Slovakia, the adoption of the euro was synonymous with the joining of the 
prosperous countries within the EU. However, the current situation shows that there are 
people who see euro as a burden and not as a blessing.  
Some Slovak officials try to find ways to leave the euro area. The president of the 
Slovak parliament stated that his country should be ready to abandon the euro area and go 
back to the old national currency, but specialists agree that such a decision would probably 
have negative consequences. Slovakia made great efforts to enter the euro area and refused to 
bring 800 million euros in the total of 110 billion euro package for the support of Greece. 
Dropping the euro would allow a country like Slovakia to depreciate its national currency.  
This way, the country would increase its commercial competitiveness as against the euro 
countries confronted with the costs of bailouts. However, there would also be the risk that 
investors would penalize the countries leaving the euro area for fear that their assets expressed 
in euro might register a depreciation, which would generate a possible financial collapse for 
the respective country.  
On January 1st 2007, Estonia became the 17th member of the EU adopting the euro, 
even if in 2010 the European Central Bank voiced concern with respect to the fact that the 
authorities in Tallin might not be able to keep inflation under control and that they could not 
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meet the convergence criteria necessary for the euro area states. However, Estonia’s decision 
to adopt the euro brings extra trust in the process of continuing the euro project.  
Estonia adhered to the EU in May 2004, within the largest expansion program that 
the EU had ever launched, and applied a solid economic reform, and for this reason it was 
nicknamed the “Baltic Tiger”. Estonia is one of the smallest European economies, with a 
population of 1.3 million people and a 13.8 billion euro GDP in 2009. In the first part of 2010, 
Estonia was the only member of the EU, which had fully respected the Maastricht criteria. At 
the end of 2009, the debt of Estonia’s state sector was 7.2% in the GDP, especially when the 
Maastricht criteria allow for a percentage of 60%. In addition, the budget deficit is one of the 
smallest in Europe – 1.7% in the GDP, although the limits are up to 3%. The budget deficit 
did not exceed 2.4% in 2010. The only problem remained inflation, which for a country that 
was about to enter the euro area did not have to go beyond 1.5%. In 2009, Estonia maintained 
a 0.2% level of inflation, but in April 2010 inflation had reached 2.9% (Bank of Estonia, 
2010).  
 
Tab.6 
Level of fulfillment of the convergence criteria by Estonia 
 
 Inflation Long-term interest 
rate 
Budgetary surplus 
or deficit 
Gross public debt 
2008 10.6 - -2.7 4.6 
2009 0.2 - -1.7 7.2 
2010 -0.7 - -2.4 9.6 
Reference value 1.0 6.0 -3.0 60.0 
Source: BCE, Convergence report, 2010 
 
Estonia is the country that thanks to a solid economic growth succeeded in having 
balanced budgets and even surpluses. These surpluses allowed for the reduction of its public 
debt to zero and at the same time created the opportunity to make investments in education 
and other public goods. The quality of costs was the key of the successful fiscal policy of the 
Baltic country.  
The economy of Estonia is very flexible and although it has been affected by the 
world crisis, it has demonstrated its capacity to function and adjust itself maintaining a fixed 
exchange rate for almost two decades.  After becoming the 17th member of the euro area, 
Estonia has continued to apply more carefully policies regarding the management of the 
public debt and public deficit, in order to favor economic growth, create jobs and maintain a 
stable inflation rate.  The introduction of the common European currency, almost forced and 
dictated by obscure reasons to set pre-established rules, was very controversial in Estonia: 
some specialists argued that its introduction would lead to increases in goods prices, others 
that the new currency  would be beneficial for the economy. The exchange rate was set at 15 
crowns for one euro.  
Compared with other papers, such as those included in the book of Euro Adoption 
in Central and Eastern Europe Opportunities and Challenges published by the IMF (IMF, 
2005) that present how the countries that adhered in 2004 should prepare, whether an early 
move is optimal, and what are the pitfalls along the way, this paper evaluates the process of 
adopting the single currency by the new member states, both through the analysis of the level 
of fulfillment of the convergence criteria and the measures taken in this respect by the 5 states 
that entered the EU in 2004 and adopted the euro currency. Thus, the paper allows 
51
highlighting the experience of the states of Central and Eastern Europe in adopting the euro, 
countries that are closer to Romania from the economic point of vue and therefore they may 
be a much better example for our country, compared to more developed countries experience 
that adopted the euro currency in 2000. 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
Most advantages coming from the adoption of the euro belong in general to the large 
states, which are very developed economically, possessing an advanced technological base, 
with high levels of labor productivity and a diversified structure of exports. In general, the 
economies of these states are relatively homogenous, with business cycles strongly 
synchronized, reacting much better to external shocks, and especially they weigh greatly in 
the decision-making process within the Economic and Monetary Union.  
As it concerns the smaller states in Central and Eastern Europe, results have been 
different. It is irrefutable the fact that in the case of these countries, after the single currency 
had been introduced, the stability of the monetary system increased because of the decrease in 
inflation, the reduction of transaction costs, the drop in the volatility of the exchange rate  and 
interest rate. Many times, because of the existent particularities within these economies or the 
lack of will/vision of the political factor, sometimes, these advantages have become 
disadvantages. 
Because the economic base of these states in Central and Eastern Europe was many 
times heterogeneous in comparison with the one existing in the large economies of the euro 
area and the business cycles were not synchronized, the common policies had positive results 
only when the specific situation in such a state was similar to the one existing in the large 
states. Because of an old technological base, a lower labor productivity and an undiversified 
and uncompetitive export, small states could not transform their monetary advantages into 
economic advantages. They had to endure also asymmetric shocks, which have taken place 
over the years, while the lack of own monetary policies weighed significantly in overcoming 
these events with high costs. 
 Adopting the single currency did not imply neither an automatic elimination of all 
problems nor a smooth path to prosperity. The monetary stability, no matter how attractive it 
may be, it is just one of the conditions – although maybe among the most important ones – for 
the economic intensification. Other conditions must be fulfilled as well before initiating this 
process, as a premature adoption of the euro may hamper or even hijack the convergence 
process.   
Thus, based on the analysis carried out on the five states, I have identified two major 
conditions necessary for a smooth adoption process of the euro by Romania: the reduction of 
the differences between GDP/capita and the harmonious evolution of the increase in prices 
and salaries. In case prices would have been adjusted more rapidly to the level of the euro 
area, the real salaries would have dropped and automatically the standard of living of the 
population would have dropped too. If, on the contrary, had the salaries increased more 
rapidly than the increase in productivity, these countries would have lost in the medium term 
important market quotas because of the diminution of competitiveness, with unwanted effects 
on the occupation level. 
For the reduction of the gaps existing between the GDP/capita among the different 
member states, a major role is played by a faster increase in labor productivity of the newly 
entered countries. In the long run, for an efficient use of the qualified workforce, countries 
that want to enter the euro area should focus especially on the creation of big added value, 
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hence avoiding the mistake of keeping a low wage base that would accelerate the 
immigrationist phenomenon and the loss of an important part of the qualified workforce. 
The global crisis had a major impact on the economies of the Central and Eastern 
European countries. The robust economic growth that many times exceeded the growth 
registered by the countries belonging to the Economic and Monetary Union, was replaced in 
2008 by an inverse trend. This fact determined mainly the reduction of the foreign capital 
inflow and especially the decrease in the private consumption generated by a generalized drop 
in revenues. The diminution of revenues affected in its turn, after a long period of time, the 
banking sector, as the volume of non-performing credits registers a continuous increase 
(Cristian, O. 2011).  All this phenomena occurred strongly in Romania, who at present registers 
high levels of uncertainty regarding the future economic and financial situation. The 
development determined mainly by the consumption of the domestic market (many times 
based in its term on credit), to the detriment of the improvement in economic performances, 
can explain also the different way in which our country has behaved after the emergence of 
the effects of the economic and global crisis. Once these effects spread, they led to a 
substantial cut in the revenues of the citizens and companies and subsequently a dramatic 
drop in the GDP was registered, especially because of the fact that the economic growth had 
previously been fueled largely by consumption, while the increase in the performance of 
exports had been neglected.  
The subsequent emergence of the effects of the global economic crisis as well as the 
implementation of the stabilization measures, which have included the increase in indirect 
charges and administered prices, have led to the maintenance of a high level of inflation.  
Seeing that food and energy have a percentage of more than 60% in the consumption basket, 
and in the future other increases in these categories of goods are anticipated (caused by the 
increases at world level as well as by the necessity to align prices), the measures implemented 
for the reduction of inflation will have to be effective.  
Taking into account that the member states of the euro area are asked to support 
financially other states overwhelmed by debts and in case the risk of contagion expands 
beyond Greece and Ireland, the adoption of the single European currency no longer represents 
a top priority for the ex communist countries still outside the euro area. Nevertheless, the 
Romanian authorities are determined to adopt the euro in 2015, while a series of countries 
such as Bulgaria, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Poland have postponed their adherence 
plans. The adoption of the euro depends on the fulfillment of the nominal convergence criteria 
established by the Maastricht Treaty, but with respect to Romania, the criterion regarding the 
public debt is the only fulfilled nominal criterion. 
I consider that the future preoccupations for the realization of the nominal and real 
convergence should aim at actions concerning the increase in the GDP/capita, the increase in 
the labor productivity as well as the increase in the volume and competitiveness of exports.  It 
is necessary to adopt measures that aim at changing the structure of the economy so that the 
latter can resemble the economic structure existent in the euro area.  This fact would lead to 
an improvement in the synchronization of the business cycles between Romania and the euro 
area countries, thus hampering the emergence of some major negative effects engendered by 
asymmetric shocks.  
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